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Abstract
  This paper investigates the effects of globalization on aggregate pro-
ductivity, output growth, and inflation. I present a simple two-country, 
two-good, flexible exchange rate model using Fisher Ideal aggregators to 
examine changes in the mapping from microeconomic to macroeconomic 
productivity growth as nations globalize. Advances in industry-specific 
labor productivity are shown to have potentially a much greater pass-
through to aggregate productivity, output, and prices the more open na-
tions are to trade. Globalization raises both the level and growth rate of 
aggregate productivity by allowing more economywide reorganization in 
response to ongoing technological advances than would be optimal other-
wise.
  I  develop  a  globalized  version  of  the  quantity  equation  of  money, 
where inflation in the home country depends on domestic money growth 
and a weighted average of home and foreign GDP growth. Relative coun-
try size, consumer preferences, production technologies, and the openness 
of trade are the chief determinants of these weights. Calibrating the model 
to match certain stylized facts about the U.S. and global economies, U.S. 
consumer price inflation falls from roughly 3.8 percent when economies 
are closed to under 2 percent in the transition period, eventually settling 
at around 2.3 percent in free trade. Producer and consumer prices trek 
a common path under autarky but diverge as the world globalizes. Both 
home and foreign aggregate productivity growth rates increase—by 0.4 
and 0.7 percentage points, respectively. Roughly 30 percent of the output 
weight in the determination of home inflation shifts from the home to 
the foreign economy—greater than might be expected from strong home 
bias.
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his paper presents a simple model to investigate the effects of global-
ization on aggregate productivity, output growth, and inflation. It 
has long been known (Ricardo 1817) that trade has the potential to raise 
living standards by allowing nations to focus production on the industries 
of their comparative advantage. Much less acknowledged are the effects of 
trade on national productivity, output, and prices as measured by conven-
tional macroeconomic aggregators. Here, I present a simple two-country, 
two-good model wherein Fisher Ideal Indexes are employed to examine 
changes in the mapping from microeconomic to macroeconomic produc-
tivity growth as globalization proceeds. Advances in industry-specific unit 
labor outputs are shown to have potentially a much greater pass-through 
to aggregate productivity, output, and prices the more open nations are to 
trade. In short, in the most basic way possible, globalization increases the 
pace of productivity and output growth and lowers inflation. 
  Previous studies of openness and inflation tend to fall into two camps—
one focusing on globalization’s effect on money growth and the other on 
its effect on productivity. On the monetary side, numerous theoretical and 
empirical studies (Romer 1993, 1998; Lane 1997; Rogoff 2003; Loungani 
and Razin 2005) offer reasoning and evidence for how globalization leads 
to lower inflation through decreasing the central bank’s incentive to in-
flate. 
  On the real side, a variety of hypotheses have been put forward where-
by globalization can raise productivity growth either through increased 
competition (Chen, Imbs, and Scott 2004; Mann 1997), through direct 
improvements in the production process (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 
2006; Jones and Kierzkowski 2001), via enhanced market incentives (Help-
man and Krugman 1985; Romer 1990; Grossman and Helpman 1991), 
from scale effects (Helpman and Krugman 1985; Rivera-Batiz and Romer 
1991), or from knowledge spillovers (Grossman and Helpman 1995; Coe 
and Helpman 1995). These studies largely concentrate on productivity 
gains at the microeconomic level—increases in output per worker within 
the firm or industry. This paper focuses instead on macroeconomic pro-
ductivity gains—improvements in the overall economy’s ability to reorga-
nize aggregate production in response to underlying shifts in unit labor 
productivity and relative prices.
  Because the effects set out here are real in nature and do not depend 
on money prices, they are independent of the exchange rate regime. It 
is generally believed that a flexible exchange rate system insulates one 
country from another’s monetary and real shocks.1 While such results may 
hold in a one-good framework, they cannot be generalized to the multi-
good framework, where macroeconomic reorganization allows nations to 
reorder production and trade in response to gains in microeconomic ef-
ficiencies that arise anywhere on the globe. As I show here, growth in the 
foreign economy affects home aggregate productivity, output, and price 
indexes—as conventionally calculated and reported in national income ac-
counts—even when exchange rates are completely flexible.
 















































There are many channels by which globalization links economies and thus 
has the potential to alter economic behavior. A thorough investigation of 
these links is beyond the scope of this paper. The goal here is to present 
a minimal deep structure model that yields multiple useful insights. Much 
can be learned from a conventional trade model of two countries and two 
goods with dissimilar production technologies.
  In Section 1, I set out the assumptions and the basic model. Section 
2 derives closed-form solutions for the variables of key interest in two 
tractable cases, with primary focus on the behavior of Fisher Ideal Price 
Indexes for aggregate consumption and production. The results of this 
section are useful for understanding globalization’s effects, but the model 
does not permit general closed-form solutions, so I turn to numerical simu-
lations in Section 3. With these two tools, it is possible to glean much 
insight into how globalization changes the relationship between micro- and 
macroeconomic productivity growth, with implications for the behavior of 
aggregate output growth and inflation. Section 4 summarizes the key find-
ings.
1. THE MODEL
  Here I set out a simple two-country, two-good trade model that cen-
ters on the basic tenets of comparative advantage and macroeconomic 
reorganization in production.
  Households in the home and foreign (*) country are assumed to maxi-
mize utility from the consumption of goods X and Y according to the 
functions
(1.1) U c c X Y = + − 


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  Leisure yields no utility. I assume the production functions display 
constant returns to scale of the economy but diminishing returns to each 
industry application. Each home household has one unit of work time 
spent in the fractions h and (1–h) working in the X and Y industries; each 
foreign household has one unit of work time spent in the fractions h* and 
(1–h*) working in the Y    * and X  * industries. Aggregate output in the X, 
Y, X  *, and Y    * industries is produced with diminishing marginal returns 
to industry labor but constant returns to the economy as
(2.1)	 X =Lxhβ,
(2.2)	 X  *=L  *x  *(1–h*)β,	  
(3.1)	 Y =Ly(1–h)β, and














































where L and L* are the number of home and foreign households, and x, y, 
x    *, and y    * reflect per-unit labor productivities in the X, Y, X    *, and Y    * 
industries, respectively. By assumption, x/y > x    */y    *.
  Note that this setup is symmetrical both in production and consump-
tion across countries. In production, the home country has a compara-
tive advantage in making X and the foreign country in making Y    *. In 
consumption, the parameter φ reflects home bias—the degree to which 
households in each country prefer the good of their comparative advantage 
(their “own good”) over their neighbor’s. 
  For simplicity, I assume there is no capital stock, no investment, and 
no savings. Thus, households face a budget constraint that the value of 
consumption must equal production, which may be written 
(4.1)	 X    +r Y=LcX+LrcY , and
(4.2)  X    *+r*Y      *=L*c* X+L*r*c* Y ,
where r is the price of good Y in terms of good X in the home country 
and similarly for r*. Following Samuelson (1954), I assume that transport 
costs are of the iceberg type and let τ denote the number of physical units 
of foreign exports that must be sent out to deliver one unit to the home 
country and τ    * the same cost of delivering one physical unit of home ex-
ports to the foreign country. With such transport costs, the home country 
must export (X–LcX)/τ    * to deliver (L*c* X–X    *) to the foreign country and 
similarly for foreign exports to the home country. So:
(5.1)	 X–LcX=τ    *(L*c* X–X    *), and
(5.2)	 Y    *–L*c* Y=τ(LcY–Y ).
  Arbitrage requires that relative prices in the two countries equalize up 
to transportation costs, so that
 
(6.1)	 r=ττ*r*.
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σ≡ 1/(1−α)	being  the  elasticity  of  substitution  in  consumption,  and   
λ ≡φ/(1−φ).











  Exchange in each country is assumed to require the use of local fiat 
money with unitary velocity, so that monetary equilibrium attains when
 
(9.1)	 M=P XX+PYY, and
(9.2)	 M*=P* XX    *+P* YY  *,
where the Ms are monies and Ps are money prices. Note that
(10.1)	 r=P Y/P X , and
(10.2)	 r*=P* Y/P* X .
  Of specific interest is the time-series behavior of the aggregate price 
indexes for production and consumption in the home country. Instead of 
using a true index, it is well known that Fisher Indexes give nearly perfect 
answers and are the type conventionally used by national accounting offices 
to gauge the magnitude of periodic change.2 These are calculated as 
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where ΠQ  and ΠC 
are the Fisher Ideal Price Indexes for production, Q, 
and consumption, C, in the home country in the current period relative 
to  a  previous  period,  and B  represents  the  base  period’s  values  of  B;   
B =X, Y, PX   , PY, and L. This notation avoids the laborious use of time 
subscripts, while also offering the flexibility to view ΠQ and ΠC as either 
price indexes or inflation rates indexed to unity, with Π Q  =  ΠC  = 1 signify-
ing no inflation in either producer or consumer prices. I follow the latter 
convention.
2. CLOSED-FORM SOLUTIONS
  The above equations may be used to solve for the values of h, h*, X, 
X  *, Y, Y    *, cX, c* X, cY, c* Y, P X, P* X , P Y, P* Y, U, U  *, r, and r*, as well as ΠQ 
and
 
ΠC. However, closed-form solutions are not generally attainable, and 
the system must be solved numerically. Section 3 presents these computed 
solutions with specific attention to the behavior of inflation. Before turn-
ing to numerical methods, however, it is instructive to investigate two 
simple cases in which closed-form solutions may be achieved. While not 
all the lessons learned from these special cases can be generalized, they 
provide valuable insights into the workings of the globalized system.
Simple Case I: Constant Returns to Scale (β=1); Cobb–Douglas  
Utility (α=0)
  For α=0, the utility function simplifies to the Cobb–Douglas form, 
with consumer budget shares constant at φ and 1−φ. For β=1, produc-
tion in all industries occurs according to constant returns to scale. If trans-
portation costs are not prohibitive to trade and each nation has adequate 
production capacity to satisfy world demand, each nation will specialize 
in producing the good of its comparative advantage.3 Given that x/y> 
x  */y  *, the home country will specialize in the production of X and the 
foreign country in Y    *. Otherwise, at least one country will be better off in 
autarky. 
  Transportation costs, unit labor productivities, the number of house-
holds, and money stocks are the exogenous variables that drive the sys-
tem. To gain insight into the evolution of productivity and prices, it is 
convenient to write the model in growth terms using the following defini-
tions, each indexed to unity:
3 Specifically, so long as τ  *(φ/(1−φ))(x  */x) <L/L*<(y  */y)(φ/(1−φ))(1/τ), the 
nations will trade and specialize, and each country’s output will be sufficient to satisfy the 














































m=M/ M = money growth in the home country;
m*=M*/ M  *= money growth in the foreign country;
=L/ – L= growth in the number of households in the home country; 
*=L*/ – L*= growth in the number of households in the foreign country; 
η=ηx≡x/x –=ηy≡y/y –= growth in unit labor productivity in each home 
industry;
η	 *=η*
x≡x  */x –*=η*
y≡y  */y –*= growth in unit labor productivity in each 
foreign industry;
g=η= growth in real output (real GDP growth) in the home country; 
g  *=*η*= growth in real output in the foreign country; 
z=τ/τ –= growth in the cost of importing goods into the home country;
z  *=τ  */τ –*= growth in the cost of importing goods into the foreign coun-
try.
  Note that z, z  *< 1 reflects the opening of trade, and z, z  *, τ, τ  *=1 is 
free trade.
  Using the above definitions, the solutions for inflation in producer and 
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  Equation 12.1 is the familiar quantity equation of money in growth 
form, which holds for producer prices in both closed and open economies.4 
Independent of foreign influence, producer prices grow at the rate of home 
money growth relative to home output (GDP) growth. Globalization does 
not affect this relationship. Consumer price inflation, however, is deter-
mined not only by the growth in home money and home GDP but also by 
foreign GDP growth. Changes in import costs matter also for consumer 
price inflation.
  When nations trade, the path of consumer prices has the potential to 
diverge substantially from producer prices, as represented by the presence 
of the bracketed term (gz/g  *).
  This can happen as a joint product of the opening of trade (z< 1) and 
foreign GDP growth or simply from strong foreign GDP growth relative 
to that at home (g  *>g). Since the utility of home consumers depends 
directly on home consumption, not production, the price index of chief 
interest is clearly ΠC , and so the discussion here focuses mainly on that 
index. Several observations are important. 
  First, consider the transition path from autarky to free trade. Before 
the opening of trade (i.e., when τ and τ  * are prohibitive), ΠC 
tracks ΠQ 
and the two home-prices indexes are indistinguishable. But as transporta-
tion costs fall (or productivities grow) to the point where the economies 
are being globalized, foreign output begins to matter for the determina-
tion of home prices and there is an added inflation-reducing effect of glo-
balization on home consumer price inflation. Neither effect is manifest in 
producer prices. 5
  Next, consider the case where τ= 1 and free trade is obtained (alter-
natively, when τ> 1 but stable, so that z = 1). Even in this steady state, 
the foreign economy continues to affect home consumer price inflation so long 
as home consumers place utility in foreign output (so long as φ< 1, so that λ 
is finite). If foreign GDP growth exceeds that at home, home inflation is 
lower in open than in closed steady-state growth. The opposite is true if 
g  *<g.6
  Several more observations are important to consider, but it is helpful 
first to rewrite equation 13.1 in a more reductive form. As I show in the 
appendix, it is possible to rewrite the solution for home consumer price 
inflation as simply
 
4  The  conventional  quantity  equation  of  money, MV=PT,  is  in  levels  but  can  be 
expressed alternatively in growth rates, as in equation 12.1, where M/ – M=m, V/ – V=1,   
P/ – P =Π, and T is the aggregate volume of transactions. One can either define PT as aggregate 
GDP transacted at output prices or as aggregate consumption transacted at consumer prices. 
In what follows, I focus largely on the latter.
5 As I show in the next section, this result cannot be generalized and, indeed, understates 
the ability of globalization to reduce inflation, since when β < 1, the growth rate in aggregate 
home output (here, simply g=η) depends on both home and foreign unit labor productivity 
growth.
6 Generally (i.e., for β < 1), globalization raises GDP growth and thus has the potential 
to reduce inflation even when foreign output growth is less than that at home. See footnote 



















































− θ 1 θ
− 1 θ,
where 0≤θ ≤ 1. The solution for θ follows below. 
  Equation 14.1 gives a globalized version of the quantity equation of 
money. Consumer price inflation in the home country depends on domestic 
money growth and a weighted average of home and foreign GDP growth. 
In the transition to freer trade, the fall in home import costs matters, too, 
with the same magnitude of influence (1−θ) as foreign growth. 
  Note  that  θ =[ln(1+λgz/g*)−ln(1+λg*/gz)]/2ln(gz/g  *),  which  is 
bound by 0 and 1, since λ,	g, g  *, z≥ 0. Since g, g  *, and z are all like-
ly to be in the neighborhood of unity, it is not interesting to consider 
the influence of these variables on the weight θ. Consumer preferences 
in this setup (where α = 0 and β= 1) are largely what govern the degree 
to which home inflation depends on home versus foreign GDP growth. 
The greater the home country’s preference for the foreign good, the lower 
are φ and λ and the lower, thus, is θ. We see that ΠCφ=0=m/g  *, and   
limφ→1θ = 1, so that φ defines the bounds of θ.
  These results are clearly intuitive. Suppose trade is free. If the home 
country produces only X and wants only X (i.e., if φ=1), then θ=1 and 
the familiar quantity equation of money obtains, ΠC =m/g. If, however, 
the home country produces only X and wants only Y    *, θ=1, ΠC =m/g  *, 
and foreign GDP growth is the only one that matters for home consumer 
prices. When home citizens want both goods, the output of both nations 
matters for home prices (0 <θ < 1). 
  Finally, in the monetary dimension, only home money growth affects 
home inflation. This result—conventional within flexible exchange rate re-
gimes—is preserved in the globalized environment even though the income 
result is not.
Simple Case II: Constant Returns to Scale (β = 1); No Home Bias (φ= ½) 
  The above case illustrates the effect of globalization on home infla-
tion, but the simplifying assumption of α= 0 does not permit evaluation 
of the role of country size since consumer budget shares spent on X and 
Y    * are constant at φ and 1−φ in this case. To investigate the influence 
of country size and still obtain closed-form solutions to explore, we may 
alternatively set φ= ½ and τ=τ  * = 1. This gives a reduced-form solution 
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where – S	≡	 – PX	– X / – PY	– Y    * is the base period size of home GDP relative to 
that abroad,  – S > 0. This expression may also be rewritten making use of 






− 1 θ' θ' ,
where 0≤θ'≤1. The solution can be found in the appendix. Again, I 
arrive at a globalized quantity equation of money. The inflation in home 
consumer prices depends on home money growth and a weighted average 
of home and foreign GDP growth, where the weights now are shown to 
depend also on relative country size and the elasticity of substitution in 
consumption, as reflected in α.
  Let’s focus first on the role of country size. Note that lim S→∞ΠC =m/g, so 
that the influence of the foreign economy on home prices wanes and the stan-
dard closed-economy result follows as the home country becomes relatively 
large in the world. In the opposite case (as – S→	0), however, we get ΠC = 
m/(gαg  *1−α), so that even when the home country is small, home GDP 
growth still matters for the determination of home inflation, so long as 
a≠0.
  Focus next on the role of a and the elasticity of substitution, σ ≡1/(1−α).
Note that as a→1, the two goods become perfect substitutes in consump-
tion and ΠC =m/g for any value of  
– S. In short, the globalized two-good, 
two-country model presented here proves that both home and foreign 
GDP growth generally matter for the determination of home consumer 
price inflation, but nested in this broad result is the standard one-good 
case wherein the quantity equation simplifies to just ΠC ≡m/g.
  This finding is important to state. The conventional expression of 
the quantity equation for consumer prices, while convenient and accurate 
for a closed economy, does not generalize to a globalized world so long 
as consumers desire more than one type of good. Globalization produces 
a new quantity equation of money where, in general, home and foreign 
GDP growth affect home inflation, and all factors—country size ( – S ), con-
sumer preferences (φ), and the elasticity of substitution in consumption 
(σ)—matter for the GDP weights.
  Proponents of flexible exchange rates often advocate such a system 
as a way to insulate the home economy from the rest of the world—from 
both foreign monetary and real shocks. However, in the most basic way 
possible—simply through trade—this independence is lost as the world 
globalizes. Although flexible exchange rates block the transmission of for-
eign monetary policy to home prices, the transmission of foreign output to 
home prices remains and is straightforward. 
  This result does not require that trade raise microeconomic productiv-
ity, as would be reflected here in the unit labor outputs x, y, x  *, and y  *. 
Trade raises both the level and growth rate of macroeconomic productiv-
ity by allowing more economywide reorganization in response to advances 
in x, y, x  *, and y  * than would otherwise be optimal.














































not require trade deficits or that a nation’s trading partner have an abso-
lute advantage in any industry. They hold here under balanced trade, even 
though the home country may trade with a nation that is less productive 
in every industry than itself.
3. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS 
  To gain further insight into the dynamics of the system and gauge the 
magnitude of globalization’s effects on productivity and inflation, it is use-
ful to simulate the model numerically. The primary goal is to examine the 
mapping from exogenous to endogenous variables as transportation costs 
fall and nations transition from closed to open economies. I present two 
simulations, one calibrated to the case where the two nations are identical 
opposites and one calibrated to match certain stylized facts about the U.S. 
and world economies. In each case, I simulate the behavior of the system 
over forty periods, through three distinct phases:
Phase 1: Autarky, periods 0–11. τ=τ    *>min{y  *L  */yL, xL/x  *L*}, 
so that transportation costs are high enough to prohibit trade. 
Phase 2: Transition, periods 12–30. z =z  *< 1 and τ=τ    *>1. 
Transportation costs are falling and no longer so high as to pro-
hibit trade.7 
Phase 3: Free trade, periods 31–40. z =z  *=τ=τ    *=1. Trans-
portation costs are eliminated, and the economies reach steady 
equilibrium.8 
For consistency throughout the two simulations, the choices of levels for 
the key exogenous variables—x, y, x  *, and y  *—center on the opening of 
trade, t =12.
The Symmetric Model
  It is instructive to begin with the case in which the two nations are iden-
tical opposites, with equal labor forces (L =L*), no home bias (φ=½), and 
mirror unit labor productivities: y=x  *, x=y  *. The levels and growth rates for 
this case are in Table 1, along with the calibrated values of the parameters α, β, 
and φ. The two nations’ labor supplies are assumed to be equal and constant. 
The two monies are assumed to be equal and growing at the rate of 6 percent 
periodically. Unit labor productivities in the X and Y  * industries are equal and 
four times those in X  * and Y, so that each nation has a distinct and equivalent 
comparative advantage in one industry.
7 For the system to reach equilibrium, it is not necessary that transportation costs fall 
to zero, only that they cease to fall. As long as z= z  *= 1 and τ = τ  *<min{y  *L*/yL, xL/
x  *L*}, the two nations will trade and reach the same long-run growth paths (albeit not the 
same levels) of the endogenous variables. 
8 Steady-state equilibrium is defined here as a constant growth rate of all exogenous 
variables, although this condition generally does not yield constant growth rates of the 
endogenous variables because relative prices and country sizes are constantly evolving when 

















































Table 1: Calibration of the Symmetric Model
Home Foreign Parameters
Variable L x y M L* x* y* M* α .1
Level: t=12 1 8 2 1 1 2 8 1 β .7
Growth rate 0 .04 0 .06 0 0 .04 .06 φ .5
For purposes of illustration, I examine only the case where x and y  * grow, 
treating the factors that led to the nation’s comparative advantage in au-
tarky as continuing throughout the opening of trade and beyond.9 Specifi-
cally, unit labor productivities in the industries of national comparative 
advantage are assumed to grow 4 percent periodically, whereas there is no 
productivity growth in the nation’s inferior industries.
  The parameters α and β are calibrated to ranges estimated by Backus, 
Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) and Gollin (2002), as discussed below in the 
presentation of the stylized asymmetric model. The parameter φ is set to 
0.2 in that case, to reflect conventional findings of a home bias in con-
sumption as exhibited in U.S. import shares; here, however, I set φ= 0.5	
to eliminate bias and facilitate interpretation of the results.
  Figure 1 shows the time path of relative prices, consumption, pro-
ducer and consumer price levels and inflation, GDP growth, and the evolu-
tion of θ. As panel A shows, relative prices exhibit complete symmetry and 
converge to unity in the absence of transportation costs. The consumption 
paths of X and Y at home are identical to those of Y    * and X  *, respec-
tively, shown in panel B. As designed—and as replicated in the behavior 
of the endogenous variables—the two nations are equal in size and identi-
cal opposites in every way and following balanced growth paths. Thus, we 
may now clearly observe globalization’s implications for the behavior of 
aggregate prices and growth, independent of country size, consumption 
bias, and asymmetric productivity growth paths.
  Note first from panels C and D that the paths of producer and con-
sumer price indexes are identical in autarky but diverge as trade is opened. 
Prior to the opening of trade, price indexes rise along roughly a 4 percent 
growth path.With the decline in transport costs and the opening of trade, 
however, the two indexes diverge—consumer prices plotting a growth tra-
jectory well below that of producer prices and rising slower than before. 
In the symmetric open case presented here, producer and consumer price 
inflation rates ultimately converge, but to just under 2 percent—a sub-
stantial reduction from the steady-state 4 percent rate under autarky.10   
9 More generally, the results derived here hold so long as ηx >ηy and η* y >η* x . The case 
of ηx<ηy and η* y<η* x is uninteresting because if such a pattern were to continue indefinitely, 
each nation’s comparative advantage would reverse and the same results derived here would 
obtain, but for opposite export and import industries. The case of
 
ηx= ηy= η* y =	η* x is too 
restrictive to be of general interest and yields no features related to the setup that are worth 
attention. 
10 As I show next, consumer and producer inflation rates do not generally converge. 
Consumer prices grow slower than those for producers so long as productivity grows faster 














































These reductions in inflation reflect an increase in aggregate productivity 
growth, as illustrated by the GDP growth path in panel E.11
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  In short, aggregate productivity and output grow faster in a global-
ized world, even with no increase in the microeconomic forces driving unit 
labor productivities in each industry. The mapping from ηx  and η* y to g 
and g  * improves owing to globalization. This is because trade facilitates 
a greater reorganization of production in response to microproductivity 
growth both at home and abroad than would be optimal otherwise. More 
11 Since the labor force is constant in this example, aggregate productivity, output, and 














































labor can be transferred to the industry experiencing productivity growth 
and the output from that industry traded for the other goods consum-
ers want than when economies are closed. In the example given here, 
globalization raises home productivity and output growth by roughly 2 
percentage points, with a concomitant reduction in inflation. Advances 
in foreign unit labor productivity are transmitted to home aggregate pro-
ductivity via domestic reorganization toward export industries, so that 
foreign growth clearly matters for home inflation.
  Let’s look next at the evolution of θ. Recall from the closed-form so-
lutions of Section 2 that home consumer price inflation can be shown as 
linked to both home and foreign GDP growth, with a weight 0≤θ≤1 on 
home GDP growth that is dependent on consumer preferences (α and φ), 
production technology (β), and relative country size. Evidence from the 
simulations suggests that this relationship may be generalized. As panel F 
shows, θ begins as 1 when the economies are closed but eventually tran-
sitions to a free trade steady state where θ=0.54 with equal symmetric 
economies.12
The Stylized Asymmetric Model
  I turn next to the asymmetric model, where relative labor forces, unit 
labor productivities, and the parameters α, β, and φ are chosen to repli-
cate certain stylized facts about the U.S. and world economies. The goal 
of this exercise is to investigate globalization’s effects on U.S. productivity 
and inflation when trade is opened to a large partner that is less produc-
tive in every industry than the U.S. but is growing relatively fast in its 
export industry. Table 2 shows the selected values of these variables and 
parameters, with the U.S. as the home country.
Table 2: Calibration of the Asymmetric Model 
Home Foreign Parameters
Variable L x y M L* x  * y  * M  * α .1
Level: t=12 1 8 2 1 19 1 1 1 β .7
Growth rate 0 .025 0 .06 0 0 .07 .09 φ .8
  I set α=0.1, which puts the elasticity of substitution at 1.1, within the range 
determined by Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1995). Following Gollin (2002) 
and in concert with observations regarding the U.S. economy, I set β= 0.7 to 
reflect labor’s share of output. Similarly, I set φ= 0.8	to reflect a bias in home 
consumption observed by Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1995) and reflected 
in U.S. imports relative to GDP. To match other stylized facts, the U.S. 
labor force (L) is assumed to be 5 percent of the world level; U.S. workers 
are assumed to be eight times as productive as foreigners in the making 
12 One might expect a steady-state θ value of 0.50 in the equal and symmetric case 
presented here, rather than the observed value of 0.54. However, g is itself endogenous and 
responds to changes in r caused by
 
ηx 
and η* y  in an amount that depends on the parameters 














































of good X and twice as productive in the making of Y. Finally, unit labor 
productivity in the X industry is assumed to be growing at the rate of 2.5 
percent, whereas productivity in Y    * is growing at a 7 percent rate.13 The 
unit labor productivities y and x  * are assumed to be constant. 
  The selected values of the parameters and exogenous variables yield 
the  following  late-transition-period  (t=24−28)  computational  values, 
which compare favorably with observations from the data:14 
  Aggregate U.S. output as a share of the world’s:   0.22
  Per capita U.S. output relative to that abroad:   5.4
  U.S. imports as a share of output:   0.18
  Growth rate of U.S. per capita output:   0.025
  To facilitate the exposition, I depart somewhat from observed norms 
for foreign productivity growth and assume that productivity in the foreign 
economy’s export sector is growing at a 7 percent rate, which translates 
into a 5½–6½ percent overall growth path for aggregate foreign output.15 
Although this path is above the average observed outside the U.S., it is 
well below that observed for our rapidly growing import partners—China 
and India—where recent per capita real growth rates have been in the 5–9 
percent range. 
  Figure 2 shows the paths of home consumer and producer prices (pan-
el A) and inflation (B), home and foreign GDP growth (C), and the evolu-
tion of θ (D) as nations move from autarky, through the transition period 
to free trade.
13 Note that for y =2, y  *=1, and η* y−ηy= .07, the foreign country develops an absolute 
advantage in the production of y      * in period 22. It can be shown that for η* y− ηy ≤ 0.025, y>y  * 
throughout the simulated forty periods, while preserving the major result that globalization 
increases the steady-state rate of home productivity growth. This finding supports the 
claim that globalization raises home productivity growth even when the home country 
trades with a nation that is less productive than it in every industry.
14 Sources of the data are the World Development Indicators database and the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis’ national income and product accounts tables. As I discuss below, 
aggregate home productivity growth increases from roughly 2.1 percent at the beginning of 
the transition period (upon leaving autarky) to 2.5 percent at the end (under free trade). 
15 It is not necessary that the foreign economy grow faster than the home economy 
for the latter to derive a steady-state decline in inflation from globalization. Globalization 
brings a reduction in inflation even when foreign growth is slower than that at home provided 
the foreign productivity gain occurs in the industry of foreign comparative advantage. One 
simple way to verify this result, not discussed above, is to note globalization’s effect on the 
foreign economy. Although globalization introduces the foreign economy to a trading partner 
whose overall growth is slower than its, consumer and producer price inflation in the foreign 
country nonetheless fall 0.25 and 0.70 percentage points, respectively, from period 12 to 
period 40. These effects are much smaller than those observed in the home country, owing 














































Figure 2, Panels A–D: The Asymmetric Case















































  Again, producer and consumer prices trek a common path under au-
tarky but diverge as the world globalizes. Most notably, inflation in U.S. 
consumer prices falls from roughly 3.8 percent when economies are closed 
to under 2 percent in the transition period, eventually settling at around 
2.3 percent in free trade.16 Home and foreign aggregate productivity growth 
rates each increase—by 0.4 and 0.7 percentage points, respectively. Finally, 
note that θ declines from 1 to 0.7, implying that roughly 30 percent of the 
output weight in the determination of home inflation shifts from the home 
to the foreign economy, greater than might be expected from the strong 
home bias (φ=0.8). These results clearly show that globalization can sig-
nificantly affect the behavior of inflation.
Sensitivity Analysis
  In this section, I conduct sensitivity analysis to examine the robustness 
of the results. In particular, I focus on the behavior of ΠC  and θ in response 
to variations in α, β, φ , and y  *.
  Figure 3 shows these results. In line with the findings from the closed-
form solutions of Section 2, a decrease in a increases the impact of globaliza-
tion on home inflation. This is because a lower α reflects a lower elasticity 
of substitution in consumption between home and foreign goods, meaning 
that consumers see foreign goods as unique. When this is the case, foreign 
16 Foreign consumer and producer price inflation rates fall as well—by 0.2 and 0.6 
percentage points, respectively. Globalization reduces both nations’ consumer and producer 
price inflation rates, but it lowers consumer inflation rates more than producer ones for 














































growth in production of the home import good has more potential to benefit 
home consumers. The opposite holds for an increase in α.
  The parameter β is important for the transition path of the inflation rate 
and for determining how fast the economy gets to the steady state, but it 
plays no role in determining the eventual steady-state inflation rate. This is 
because as long as ηx 	 >ηy  and η* y>η* x , each nation will eventually specialize 
in the good of its comparative advantage.
  As could be expected, the path of ΠC  is highly sensitive to φ—the size of 
the home bias. A decrease in φ from 0.8 to 0.7 lowers the transition path of 
home consumer price inflation by nearly 2 percentage points and the steady-
state path by roughly 0.6 percentage point. The more consumers like foreign 
goods (i.e., the lower φ is), the more globalization lowers home inflation, es-
pecially when growth in those favored foreign industries is strong.
Figure 3, Panels A–D: Sensitivity Analysis on ΠC





















































  Finally, note that the level of productivity in the foreign export industry 
upon the opening of trade (y  *) substantially affects the transition path of infla-
tion from autarky to free trade but has no effect on the eventual steady state. 
The greater y  * is upon the opening of trade, the more home consumers can 
benefit from trade in terms of lower prices. But the steady-state path of
 
ΠC, 
though lower in a globalized world, is unaffected by y  * since the steady-state 
growth rates of productivity are unaffected by level changes.
  Figure 4 shows the effect on θ of varying α, β, φ, and y  *. As with
 
ΠC, 
the sensitivity of θ to the calibrations of β and y  * are slight, affecting only the 
transition path and not the steady state, whereas α and φ have relatively large 














































Figure 4, Panels A–D: Sensitivity Analysis on θ
















































y* = 1 y* = 2
D
   In view of the sensitivity of the model outcomes to variation in α and 
φ—and to a lesser extent, β and y  *—it is useful to examine the effects of 
calibration on the computed benchmark values shown in Table 2. Table 
3 shows how varying α, φ, β, and y  * affects the computed model values 
of imports relative to GDP, the share of world output the home country 
produces, and home relative to foreign GDP per capita.17 The parameter 
β has little effect on any of these values and, moreover, is confined by ob-
servations from Gollin (2002) and thus is set confidently at 0.70. Variation 
in the parameter φ—reflecting home bias—clearly has a strong effect on
Table 3: Implications of Sensitivity Analysis for Selected Model Values 
Model Parameter α β φ y  *
Model value 0 .1 .2 .65 .70 .75 .7 .8 .9 .5 1 2
Aggregate U.S. 
output as a share 
of the world’s
.22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .23 .22 .22 .22 .34 .22 .13
Per capita U.S.   
output relative   
to that abroad
5.5 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 9.9 5.4 2.9
U.S. imports as a 
share of output .20 .18 .16 .18 .18 .19 .08 .18 .28 .17 .18 .19
17 Table 3 varies one parameter, keeping each of the others constant at its value shown 














































the model computation of imports relative to home GDP, causing those 
values to stray well outside bounds currently observed in the data.18 A 
similar result obtains from varying α. The implied computed value of 
home imports falls (rises) markedly as α rises (falls) to reflect more (less) 
perceived substitutability between home and foreign goods by consumers. 
Similarly, the choice of y  * clearly has a large effect both on the computed 
values of aggregate U.S. output relative to the world and on U.S. per cap-
ita GDP relative to that abroad. The computed benchmark values match 
stylized facts from the data for y  *=1 but stray widely from observed 
bounds as foreign productivity levels deviate from that defined value.
  In sum, the model calibrations presented in Table 2 appear most 
consistent with observations from the data and are preferred, providing 
confidence for the central findings stated above.
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
  It is standard practice in national income accounting to measure econ-
omywide output, consumption, productivity, and prices using Fisher Ideal 
aggregators. Implicit in the utilization of such indexes is the observation 
that the supplies of individual goods and their prices tend to grow at 
divergent rates—through technological change, shifts in preferences, and 
trade. Economists have also recognized for nearly two centuries that na-
tional consumption can rise when nations open themselves to trade and 
reorganize aggregate production toward the good of their comparative 
advantage. Yet relatively little attention has been given to how trade 
manifests itself in the performance of aggregate indexes.
  This paper focuses on how globalization affects the mapping from 
microeconomic to macroeconomic productivity growth. Advances in in-
dustry-specific unit labor outputs are shown to have potentially a much 
greater pass-through to aggregate consumption, output, productivity, and 
prices the more open nations are to trade. Globalization raises both the 
level and growth rate of aggregate productivity by allowing more econo-
mywide reorganization in response to technological advances than would 
be optimal otherwise.
  The model presented here shows that when countries are open to 
trade, the standard quantity equation of money does not hold and must 
be replaced with a globalized version where home country inflation de-
pends on domestic money growth and a weighted average of home and 
foreign GDP growth. Relative country size, consumer preferences, produc-
tion technologies, and the openness of trade are the chief determinants of 
these weights. 
  Proponents of flexible exchange rates often advocate it as a way to in-
sulate the home economy from foreign monetary and real shocks. However, 
in the most basic way possible—through trade—this independence is lost 
as the world globalizes. Although a flexible exchange rate regime blocks the 
transmission of foreign monetary policy to home prices, the transmission 
of foreign output to home prices remains and is straightforward. Nested in 
the general setup presented here is, indeed, the standard one-good model 














































where the quantity equation simplifies to its conventional form and the 
home economy is independent of foreign influence. Advocates of flexible 
exchange rates will welcome this familiar result—but find their comfort 
confined to the narrow space of one-good models. So long as consumers 
view home and foreign goods as imperfect substitutes (i.e., when there are 
two or more distinct goods), both home and foreign outputs matter for the 
determination of home prices.
  Producer and consumer prices trek a common path under autarky but 
diverge as the world globalizes. The smaller the home country, the more 
consumers view each good uniquely, and the smaller the bias in home 
consumption, the more producer and consumer price indexes will diverge 
when nations trade. Policymakers will find it problematic to use one price 
index to infer movements in the other.
  Calibrating the model to match certain stylized facts about the U.S. 
and global economies, U.S. consumer price inflation falls from roughly 3.8 
percent when economies are closed to under 2 percent in the transition 
period, eventually settling at around 2.3 percent in free trade. Home and 
foreign aggregate productivity growth rates each increase—by 0.4 and 0.7 
percentage points, respectively. Roughly 30 percent of the output weight 
in the determination of home inflation shifts from the home to the foreign 
economy—greater than might be expected from the strong home bias.
  By all accounts, globalization is important for the determination of 
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applying repeated operations. Clearly, for A = 1 (i.e., when g  *=gz), θ is 










− ln( ) ln( )
ln
λ λ A A
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,
for A≠1	we must consider two cases.
Case I: 0<A<1
  0<A<1 implies lnA<0, so that 0≤θ≤1 iff 0≥ln(1+λA)−	










given that φ ≥ 0, we see that ln(1+λA–1)≥ln(1+λA), and thus the left-
hand side of the 0≤θ≤1 inequality is satisfied. The term ln(1+λA)−	
ln(1 +λA–1) can be easily transformed to
ln ( ) ln ( ) A A A A λ λ + 






–1               –1 ,
which equals ln(λ+A–1)−ln(λ+A)+2lnA, and thus the right-hand side of 
the 0≤θ≤1	inequality is clearly satisfied, since ln(λ+A–1)≥ln(λ+A) for   
0<A<1. Thus, 0≤θ≤1	for 0<A<1.
Case II: A>1
  A>1 implies lnA>0, so that 0≤θ≤1 iff 0≤ln(1+λA)−
ln(1+λA–1)≤2lnA. Now A>1 implies that ln(1+λA)≥ln(1+λA–1), so the 
left-hand side of the 0≤θ≤1 inequality is satisfied. Again, ln(1+λA)−	
ln(1+λA–1) can be  transformed to ln(λ+A–1)−ln(λ+A)+2lnA, so the right-
hand side of the 0≤θ≤1 inequality is satisfied, since ln(λ+A–1)≤
ln(λ+A) for A>1. Thus, 0≤θ≤1	for A>1. It follows that θ is bound by 0 
and 1.
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